


Strong Batching for Non-Interactive Statistical Zero-Knowledge by Preserving Entropy under Hash Composition.

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
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This poster is based on the "Strong Batching for Non-Interactive Statistical Zero-Knowledge" [Mu, Nassar, Rothblum, and Vasudevan; Eurocrypt2024].



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Non-Interactive Statistical Zero Knowledge Proofs [GMR89; BFM88].



- **Completeness:** If $x \in \text{YES}$: Verifier accept with 99%.
- **Soundness:** If $x \in \text{NO}$: No Prover can make Verifier accept with probability more than $\frac{1}{3}$.
- **Statistical Zero-Knowledge:** There exists some efficient simulator algorithm Sim such that on any YES input $x \in \text{YES}$, it can simulate a distribution *statistically* close to the Verifier's view in the protocol:

$$\text{Sim}(x) \approx_s \text{CRS} \parallel \pi.$$

We call the class of problems that have non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proofs **NISZK** problems.


NISZK Complete Problems [SCPY98; GSV99]

The class NISZK has complete problems. That is, there exists a problem Π such that:

- Π can be proved in non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof.
- Every promise problem that has non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof can be reduced to Π .

Theorem 1: Approximate Injectivity (AI) [KRRSV20; KRV21]

Input: circuit $C : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^t$ $t \geq n$




C is **YES**($\text{AI}_{\delta,L}$) if it is injective on all but δ -fraction of inputs


C is **NO**($\text{AI}_{\delta,L}$) if it is L -to-1 on all but δ -fraction of inputs

$\text{AI}_{\delta,L}$ is **NISZK-complete** for $L(n) < 2^{n^{0.1}}$, $\delta > 2^{-n^{0.1}}$. [KRRSV20; KRV21]

How is Injectivity related to Non-Interactive Statistical Zero-Knowledge?



□ Input: length-preserving circuit $C : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$



- **Completeness:** Perfect, because any value of z has a preimage of the permutation.
- **Soundness:** NO case, the circuit is L -to-one, a random z doesn't have a preimage with probability at least $1-1/L$.
- **ZK:** simulator samples x and output $(\text{crs} = C(x), \pi = x)$. Perfect Zero-Knowledge

NISZK Batching [KRRSV20; KRV21; MNRV24]

In batching verification setting, there are k instances to verify, we want to verify them in SZK proof with communication better than naive repetition. Specifically, if m is the number of communication bits required for one instance, we want the communication cost for verifying k instances to be much less than $k \cdot m$.

	Communication Complexity	Round Complexity	Interaction
[KRRSV20; KRV21]	$O(\text{poly}(m) + k)$	k	Interactive
This Work	$\text{poly}(m, \log k)$	1	Non-interactive


Theorem 2: NISZK Strong Batching [MNRV24]

Suppose a problem Π has NISZK protocol with $m(n)$ bits of communication and CRS length, then for any $k \in O(2^{n^{0.01}})$, there exists a NISZK protocol that proves k instances x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k with $\text{poly}(m, \log k)$ communication and CRS length.


Reduce k instances to one

If k circuits are length preserving, direct composition gives a new length-preserving instance:

$$\bar{C} = C_k \circ \dots \circ C_1$$




When $t > n$, we can not compose directly, and using random hash functions to connect them is a natural idea. However, even one round of such composition on injective circuits will introduce massive collisions.



We observe and prove that the collision probability is preserved under the hash composition

$$\bar{C} = h_k \circ C_k \circ \dots \circ h_1 \circ C_1.$$



Specifically:

- If $C_1, \dots, C_k \in \text{YES}$, with 1-negl probability: $\text{cp}(\bar{C}) = \Pr_{x_1, x_2 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [\bar{C}(x_1) = \bar{C}(x_2)] \leq \frac{2k+1}{2^n}$ or, the Rényi Entropy (order 2) is big:

$$H_2(\bar{C}) = -\log \text{cp}(\bar{C}) \geq n - \log k + 1.$$

- If some $C_i \in \text{NO}$, the Max Entropy of \bar{C} is small:

$$H_0(\bar{C}) = \log |\text{support}(\bar{C})| \leq n - \log L, \quad L \in O(2^{n^{0.01}}).$$

Reduce Entropy to Uniformity/Injectivity

	Input	Yes/No	Problem Name	Completeness
Asymptotic Equipartition Property Load balancing	C_1, \dots, C_k	All Injective / Exists L-to-1	Approximate Injectivity	NISZK-Complete [KRRSV]
	$\hat{C}_k = (h_k \circ C_k \circ \dots \circ h_1 \circ C_1)$	High Smooth Rényi Entropy / Low Max Entropy	Smooth Entropy Approx	NISZK-Complete (This work)
	$\hat{C} = h, h(\hat{C}_k)$	Close to uniform / Far from uniform	Statistically Close to Uniformity	NISZK-Complete [GSV]
	$\hat{C}(x_1), \dots, \hat{C}(x_k), g, g(x_1, \dots, x_k)$	Injective / L-to-1	Approximate Injectivity	NISZK-Complete [KRRSV]

The prover and verifier will reduce k instances of a NISZK-complete problem to one instance, and run one execution of NISZK protocol on the single instance. Note that the communication cost of the protocol is dependent on the input/output length of the circuit, and thus will not increase much.

What's More

- **Derandomization:** The Collision Probability of the Composed Circuit can be modelled by a Read-Once Branching Program. Nisan's pseudorandom generator [Nis92] is used to sample hash functions, which derandomizes the Common Random String (CRS).
- [KRV24]: **Doubly-Efficient** Batch Verification in SZK for $\text{NISZK} \cap \text{UP}$.

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